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OBITER D ICTA
"An obiter dictum, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an
individual impertinence,/ which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong,,
bindeth none-not even the lips that utter it."*

PORTRAIT OF

Two

JUDGES

Two books have recently reached my desk. The first is written by Max -Lerner.
It is entitled The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes and consists in the main of
I
excerpts from Holmes' writings with explanatory forewords
by Professor Lerner. (See Ford, Book Review, infra p. 303).
Two
The second is from the pen of Judge John C. Knox, senior
Books
United States judge in the Southern District of New York,
and is aptly entitled Order in the Court. Both books deal 'with the law interspersed
with extra legal materials. Each reveals the personality and philosophy of a judge
in action. Together they suggest to a reviewer an interesting study of contrasted
judicial careers. Lerner sings the praises of the "mind and faith" of the peerless
judge whose former dissents have now been translated in a considerable degree into
the majority opinions of the reformed Supreme Court. Order in the Court modestly
unfolds the autobiographical story of a humble Federal judge doing his daily work
without fanfare or fuss.
In the well known essay wherein he condescends to deliver his "eulogy" over the
Natural Law, Justice Holmes cynically remarks that "there is in' all men a demand
for the superlative so much so that the poor devil who has
no other way of reaching it attains it by getting drunk."
Higk
Certain it is that this alleged urge to superlatives (without
Praise
,Ithe
aid of intoxicating beverages) is strongly evidenced in
the extravagant praise heaped upon Holmes by his many followers. Justice Cardozo
rates his distinguished predecessor on the 'Supreme Court as "the greatest of our
age in the domain of jurisprudence." Justice Frankfurter, lifelong admirer of Justice
Holmes, credits him above all others with shaping and directing the course of
American current law. But Lerner refuses to limit the excellence of Holmes to
the "domain of jurisprudence"; with spread-eagle magniloquence his blurb proclaims
that "Holmes was perhaps the best-rounded mind and personality that America has
produced." This is high adulation and from eminent sources, but one may wonder
whether Holmes' admirers may not be doing him a disservice in proclaiming him
as the greatest jurist and "the best-rounded mind". of the New World. No. one
familiar with the life of Holmes can deny his personal charm and eternal youth, his
sparkling style and sweep of learning, but it is suspected that his admirers have
forgotten his own warnings anent the excessive use of superlatives in their maximum
rating of Holmes as a judge and particularly as a philosopher.
In marked contrast with the acclaim of Holmes the judicial journey of Judge
Knox has aroused no similar applause from jurists.or legal philosophers. He has
*Birrell, Obiter Dicta (1885) title page.
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been quietly performing his judicial work for a quarter ,of century. Into his courtroom have come seamen, tradesmen, aliens, criminals and common folk with their
quarrels and disputes to be settled by the application of rules of law sometimes
softened by a sympathetic regard for the frailties of humankind. Devoid of all
attempt at literary style and telling the story of his judicial career in simple language,
Judge Knox is no match for the jurist so expert "in mating adjective and noun",
the verbal craftsman who--in the thought of Cardozo- was able to pack the phosphorescence of a page into a single paragraph. Few "great cases" appeared upon
Judge Knox's docket to balance the mighty causes passed upon by Justice Holmes
in Massachusetts and later in Washington. Indeed, Lerner makes it seem that any
case that Holmes decided became great because of the majestic sentences which fell
from his gifted pen.
The unfairness of attempting to weigh the judicial accomplishments of Holmes and
Knox seems to be accentuated when we recall the advantages of heredity and
environment enjoyed by the former. Son of the "Autocrat
Holmes
of the Breakfast Table", having access in his youth to the
V.
best table conversation in New England, reared in the enKnox
virons of Beacon Street, sitting at the feet of Emerson,
Wendell Phillips and Theodore Parker, young Holmes naturally developed a facility
of expression and ability to turn out "pretty phrases" that. remained his pride
and joy during his long life. The danger is that this architect of words may have
failed to distinguish form from substance, and may have missed t]te great truths of
life in his quest for a smart aphorism. Judge Knox came from the countryside
of Pennsylvania; he did not enjoy an early association with the brilliant James boys,
William and Henry, or receive his education at Harvard with the elite of New
England; he started his legal career in New York without a friend or patron; and
following a brief tenure as special assistant in the office of the Attorney General,
he was appointed federal judge. Yet this man seems to have caught something in
his journey through life that failed to attract the attention of the dwellers in
Beacon Street, something that reminds us of the plain homespun philosophy of
Lincoln, something that we believe symbolizes the true American tradition.
What is the mental afterglow of a reviewer who has read Lerner's appraisal of
Holmes as perhaps the peer of all minds and personalities in a country which has
given us Washington, Lincoln and Wilson? The writings of
Holmes'
Holmes himself provide our answer. He tells us that the
Philosophy
essence of truth is physical force; that there is no natural
law or absolute rights; that law and morals must be completely severed; that current morals are mere passing fancies of the moment and
without enduring value. Turning to an appraisal of man, Holmes reduces him to the
status of a "cosmic ganglion" whose bowels are rated as important as his brains,
for functioning and living are the things that really-count. "It would be well",
he says, "if the intelligent classes could forget the word sin and think less of being
good." And at the end, the very end of life, his last words would be "0 Cosmos,
lettest thou thy ganglion dissolve in peace!" (See Ford, The Fundamentals of
Holmes' Juristic Philosophy (1942) 11 FORDIAm L. REV. 255).
One closes Lerner's volume with the sad and sickening feeling that the lofty praise
and superlative rating of Justice Holmes need a revaluation. It is feared that the-
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warmth and color of Holmes personality have warped the judgment of his intimates
and associates. The facial beauty of his juristic style has overshadowed his cynical
and give-it-up pessimism; his spirit of defeatism isveneered with pretty phrases.
A final appraisal of Holmes-man, jurist, philosopher-must wait a more matured
judgment divorced from the fulsome praise and extravagant enthusiasm, of his contemporaries.
Pending such postponed evaluation; the reader may turn to Order in the Court
and read the memoirs of a judge who knows not, or at least believes not, the
"cosmic-ganglion" theory of life and law; who conceives of justice as a living attainable objective; a wise judge who mixes law with compassion and believes that "in a
world where justice everywhere holds her scales at even balance, mankind will never
fail to improve upon the past?'
,
W.B.K.

THE TESTAMENTARY CHARACTER OF UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS
Recently a statute was passed in New York which settles any dispute as to the
disposition of the proceeds of non-transferable United States Savings Bonds. Section 24, PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (L. 1943, Ch. 632) now
provides that the right of a beneficiary to receive payment
The New York
of a bond according to its terms shall not be defeated by
Statute
any statute or rule of law governing transfer of property by
will. However, since many United States Savings Bonds are presently held in
estates of persons who died before the effective date of- the new statute, the question of rights arising under these bonds in the absence of such a statute is still of
significance in New York as well as in jurisdictions which have not enacted such
legislation.
In Deyo v. Adams, 178 Misc. 859 (1942) an executrix sought to recover for the
estate certain United States Savings Bonds purchased in the name of the decedent
and payable to him with provision therein that on his death
A New York
said bonds, if still outstanding, would be payable to his sister.
Decision
The sufficiency of the complaint was sustained at Special
Term. It was held that the attempted disposition of the
proceeds of the bonds was a testamentary disposition and void for failure to comply
with the Statute of Wills (N. Y. DEC. EST. LAw § 21). The court relied heavily upon
McCarthy v. Pieret, 281 N. Y. 407, 24 N. E. (2d) 102 (1939), which involved a
mortgage extension agreement providing that, in the event of the mortgagee's death,
payments of interest and principal due thereafter should be-made to the plaintiffs, a
brother and nieces of the mortgagee. An action to recover interest payments under
the agreement was brought against the mortgagor, who interpleaded the decedent's
administrator. A majority of the Court of Appeals held the agreement to be testa,mentary in character and so invalid under the Statute of Wills. The basis for the
holding was that no present interest was .created in the beneficiary at the time the
agreement was made since the interest of the beneficiary was contingent upon the
death of the mortgagee before maturity of the bond. The opinion in Deyo v. Adams
also cited Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash. 549, 92 P. (2d) 254 (1939), where it was
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held that certain United States Savings Bonds belonged to the testate rather than
to the beneficiary because the donor had not absolutely and irrevocably divested himself of present control over the property.
A contrary result was reached in a later New York case, in which the plaintiff in
Deyo v. Adams instituted a proceeding in the Surrogate's Court to compel a coexecutor to take no position adverse to that of the petitioning executrix in the pending action in the Supreme Court.
A Contrary
In Re Deyo, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 379 (1943). Surrogate Foley's
Holding
decision that the bonds were not assets of the estate was
based upon the application of the doctrine that a third party beneficiary may enforce
a contract clearly intended for his benefit, at least where there is a certain degree
of family relationship between the promisee and the beneficiary. Seaver v. Ransom,
224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639 (1918); see (1943) 29 Com. L. Q. 109. However, the
flaw in this argument is that at the time the contract is made, that is, at the time
the bond is issued, the beneficiary acquires no vested right. If a promise is in terms
conditional, the beneficiary can acquire no right under it unless and until the condition happens or is performed. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 364 (A). In the bond
cases the condition upon which the right is to vest is the death of the donor, and
therefore, the provision for payment to the beneficiary would seem to be testamentary in character. [Cf. 52 YALE L. J. 917 (1943)].
However, Surrogate Foley also pointed out that even if a conflict between the
State law as of wills and regulations of the Treasury Department pertaining to
Savings Bonds did exist, the latter should govern, disagreeing with the holding in Deyo v. Adams that the federal reguThe Correct
lations do not preclude the application of state law deterApproach
mining the validity of the devolution of the property. The
conflicting views of the Supreme Court and the Surrogate are reflected in the administration of another estate. The Surrogate first decided that the bonds in question
belonged to the estate, rhther than the named beneficiary, following Deyo v. Adams.
In Re Karlinski's Estate, 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 297 (1942). However, prior to the entry
of a final decree, the United States Attorney intervened and asked for a reconsideration of the decision. The Surrogate reversed his prior decision on the ground that
war bonds have been sold, under the representation that the obligation will be paid
in the manner designated in the bond, and to deny payment to the beneficiary because
of a formality hampers the raising of funds necessary to prosecute the war.
In Re Karlinski's Estate, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 40 (1943). The Congressional power
to declare war carries with it the power to put into effect such procedures as are
reasonably adapted-to achieve victory. International Association of Machinists v.
E. C. Stearns & Co., 17-8 Misc. 661, 664, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 156, 159 (1942). The
statute authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to issue United States Savings
Bonds subject to such terms and conditions as he may prescribe is a valid exercise of
the power conferred upon Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
"to borrow money on the credit of the United States." It clearly lies within the
implied power of Congress to provide a method of payment on its obligations and
the regulations under which the bonds were issued have the force of Federal law.
Warren v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 634 (1929); cert. denied 281 U. S. 739 (1930),
decided that the Treasury can not be compelled to make payment of a bond to anyone

